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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL DESIGN: THE
MOORHEAD BILL
Susan TENNENBAUM *
"The crass are rewarded, the
artist who creates beauty is
not" [1].
Judge Weinstein, dissenting
in Kieselstein -Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc.
1. Introduction
Congress has historically excluded commercial design [2] from the realm of
copyright protection [3]. Although the First Congress granted copyright protec-
tion to such functional objects as maps and charts [4], and the Supreme Court
has indicated that decorative articles that are useful in nature may still enjoy
constitutional protection [5], extending copyright to the design of useful objects
has been thought to be against the public interest.
Opponents of this repeatedly proposed extension [6] have advanced three
principal arguments. First, copyrighting objects would monopolize an entire
style or trend [7]. Second, because consumer preference sometimes demands
uniformity of shape for certain everyday articles, extending a manufacturer a
monopoly on such a shape would preclude others from making the same article
[8]. Third, granting copyright to the design of a useful object where the shape is
mandated by the function (e.g. scissors or paper clips) would tie up the idea of
the object and thus undermine the basic premise that copyright "in no case ...
extend(s) to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery" [9]. In short, opponents fear that this extension
will render useful articles inaccessible to the general public.
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Designers and manufacturers of original designs, on the other hand, argue
that the current protection for commercial design provided under the copyright
and patent laws fails to prevent even flagrant instances of design piracy [10].
Proponents of design copyright, moreover, match the arguments against design
copyright with a set of equally standard arguments, maintaining that this
extension would have, at worst, an economically neutral effect [11].
The most recent proposal to amend the Copyright Act to include protection
for commercial design is a bill submitted by Congressman Moorhead of
California [12]. This Comment examines the contents of this bill, analyzes the
reasons for and against its enactment, and concludes that it should be adopted.
In general, the arguments supporting and opposing design copyright tend to be
speculative and theoretical. It is, therefore, useful to study a system already in
existence that protects commercial design by copyright. Such a system exists in
the United Kingdom.
This Comment begins by outlining the current status of design protection
under U.S. law and then analyzes the Moorhead bill. Against this background,
the British copyright laws are examined and the Moorhead bill is evaluated in
light of the advantages and disadvantages of the British model.
2. The current status of copyright and design patent protection in the United
States
2.1. The U.S. design patent laws
Although commercial design receives no copyright protection, Congress has
offered protection for the design of useful objects under the patent statute
since 1842 [13]. The current statute states: "Whoever invents any new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title" [14]. The
standard for the design patent, which requires the design be new, original and
ornamental, is different from that for patents for inventions [15], which
requires inventions to be useful, novel and nonobvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the art [16]. Some courts, however, have held design to the stricter
standard for inventions, requiring the design to be nonobvious, as well as new,
original and ornamental [17]. Indeed, one court required that the design be
"beyond the skill of the ordinary designer or draftsman" [18].
Due to these requirements, it is estimated that only one in three design
patterns proves valid in litigation [19]. Furthermore, the concept of nonobvi-
ousness, when applied to aesthetic aspects of a design, requires that courts
make artistic judgments, ajudicial function that the Supreme Court has held to
be inappropriate [20. Moreover, although the design patent laws often force
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courts to be arbiters of aesthetics, this has not ensured that only superior
designs are awarded protection. As one commentator has observed:
[The] fact that a design presents a combination of elements not previously found in a particular
article may not be a tribute to the designer's skill, but merely a sign that this combination is
inappropriate to the function for which the article is intended. Thus, the standard of "inventive-
ness" has not only failed to provide a firm basis for commercial reliance, but has also failed to
encourage any recognized form of excellence in design [21].
Furthermore, the evaluation process required to assess such criteria as
nonobviousness and novelty results in an excessive time lag between filing and
issuance. In 1975, this time lag was reported to be about twenty-one months
[22]. Since design patent protection begins only upon issuance, it is easily
possible for the marketability of a commercial design to expire, and for design
piracy to occur before protection can be granted. Judge Learned Hand
addressed this problem in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. [23], a case in which
the Second Circuit held that a silk manufacturer whose designs were being
copied could not enjoin unfair competition despite the impractibility of
securing design patents or the inability to obtain copyright. Judge Hand
stated:
The plaintiff ... is a manufacturer of silks, which puts out each season many new patterns,
designed to attract purchasers by their novelty and beauty. Most of these fail in that purpose, so
that not much more than a fifth catch the public fancy. Moreover, they have only a short life, for
the most part no more than a single season of eight or nine months. It is in practice impossible,
and it would be very onerous if it were not, to secure design patents upon all of these. It would also
be impossible to know in advance which would sell well, and patent only those ... . So it is easy
for any one to copy such as prove successful, and the plaintiff, which is put to much ingenuity and
expense in fabricating them, finds itself without protection of any sort for its pains [24].
As Judge Hand points out, design patent fails to provide what the commer-
cial designer needs most - immediate short-term protection with which the
designer can launch his or her design into a market of quickly changing styles.
2.2. Copyright as a more viable form of design protection
One essential difference between patent and copyright is that patent, unlike
copyright [25], protects ideas by protecting the process or system invented or
discovered. Design patent also provides an absolute monopoly to make, use, or
sell an ornamental design as applied to an article of manufacture [26]. In
contrast, however, copyright does not preclude others from independently
creating a work coincidentally identical to the originator's and securing rights
thereon [27]; it protects a work only against copying by others [28].
Because the law sanctions a more extensive monopoly in the case of patents,
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it is understandably more difficult to obtain a patent. Thus, whereas a difficult
standard must be met to obtain patent protection, copyright protection auto-
matically attaches to "original works of authorship, fixed in any tangible
medium of expression" at the time the work was created [29]. Moreover, it is
logical that the more extensive monopoly of patent should be of shorter
duration. Thus, since 1978, copyright protection in newly created works lasts
for the duration of the author's life plus fifty years [30], whereas the duration
of a design patent is only fourteen years [31].
Although the shorter duration of the design patent is of adequate length for
the short life of most commercial designs, the time lag between filing and
issuance, as mentioned earlier, is much too long. Copyright allows for no time
lag at all during which the design is without protection; it attaches at the time
the work is created [32]. Therefore, for the purposes of the commercial
designer, copyright provides protection superior to that of design patent in
terms of appropriateness of the standard [33], judicial response [34], and speed
with which protection attaches [35].
3. The concept of separability: Mazer -v. Stein and its progeny
The Supreme Court's decision in Mazer v. Stein [36] marked a turning point
in the history of legal protection for commercial design. "Until 1954 it had
been widely assumed that the only statutory protection for the designs of
utilitarian articles was that available under the design patent law, which dated
back to 1842" [37]. In Mazer, however, the Court held that a statuette of a
Balinese dancer, which was copyrightable as an original work of art, did not
cease to be copyrightable by serving as a lamp base [38]. The lamp's eligibility
for a design patent did not preclude simultaneous protection of the statuette
via copyright [39]. In upholding the copyrightability of a work of art that had
been incorporated into a useful object, the Court in Mazer left room for two
interpretations [40]. A broad interpretation would suggest that if a useful
object is also a work of art, its form is copyrightable. This interpretation would
fully extend copyright protection to commercial design. Narrowly read, the
decision "preserves copyright protection for objects of art which perform
utilitarian functions merely by becoming separable parts of essentially utilita-
tian objects" [41]. It is this narrow interpretation that has since been accepted.
The fact that copyright existed only in the statuette base, which was physically
separable from the rest of the lamp, led to the concept of separability, which
was codified in the 1976 Act [42] and articulated in Esquire o. Ringer [43].
Esquire raised the question whether the overall shape of a lighting fixture
was copyrightable. The fixture was a "nontraditional form, devoid of orna-
mentation or decoration but of pleasing shape and used apparently for outside
lighting of parking lots ... ." [44]. The Register of Copyrights denied registra-
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tion on the grounds that there was nothing separate or distinguishable from the
shape of the intrinsically useful object and that the design as a whole could not
be separately identified or "exist independently" as a "work of art" [45].
Citing Mazer, the Register contended that "productions of the industrial arts
utilitarian in purpose and character are not subject to copyright registration,
even if artistically made or ornamental" [46].
The District Court disagreed, and held that the emphasis of Esquire's
fixtures on "line and shape rather than the realistic or the ornate" should not
bar registration [47]. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, however, applying the separability standard for
utilitarian objects and citing the House Report pertaining to that section of the
1976 Act governing "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works." This Report
states:
lA]lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the
Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an
automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial product
contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill. The test of
separability and independence from "the utilitarian aspects of the article" does not depend upon
the nature of the design - that is, even if the appearance of an article is determined by aesthetic (as
opposed to functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be identified separately from
the useful article as such are copyrightable. And, even if the three dimensional design contains some
such element (for example, a carving on the back of a chair or a floral relief design on silver
flatware), copyright protection would extend only to that element, and would not cover the overall
configuration of the utilitarian article as such [48].
The Court of Appeals further noted that the possibility that Esquire might
claim that the artistic element is "conceptually" separable disappears when the
work is considered in its proper context [49]. "Conceptual separability" has
been used to refer to two-dimensional, and occasionally three-dimensional,
shapes and patterns embellishing useful objects, where the ornamental aspect
cannot be physically separated from the article it decorates. Courts have, thus,
readily extended copyright to designs on fabric [50] and dinnerware [51].
Under no circumstances, however, according to the court in Esquire, did
Congress intend that the notion of conceptual separability be applied to "the
overall design or configuration of a utilitarian object, even if it is determined
by aesthetic as well as functional considerations" [52].
Nevertheless, the recent controversial case of Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories
by Pearl, Inc. [53] did apply "conceptual separability" in this way. In Kiesel-
stein, a divided panel of the Second Circuit upheld copyright in the designs of
two belt buckles. The designer of the belt buckles brought suit for alleged
copyright infringement and sought to enjoin the defendant from manufactur-
ing two of plaintiff's designs that plaintiff had registered with the Copyright
Office as jewelry [54]. The defendant admitted to copying the designs and
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selling the imitations, but claimed that the copyrights were invalid because the
buckles were "useful articles" with no "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural fea-
tures that [could] be identified separately from, and [were] capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects" of the buckles [55]. The Second
Circuit, in reversing the District Court's issuance of summary judgment, found
the buckles to be "conceptually separable sculptural elements" and, thus,
copyrightable [56].
The court's application of the notion of conceptual separability erroneously
"implies that Congress intended to protect objects like the Kieselstein-Cord
belt buckles whose artistic elements are inextricably bound with their func-
tional ones" [57]. The court cites as an illustration of conceptual separability
Professor Nimmer's example of Christo's "Running Fence" [58], thereby
equating Congress' reference to conceptual separability with conceptual art.
Nimmer views the artistic idea of the fence as conceptually separable from
the structure of the fence itself, even though the basic structure of the fence
was identical to a purely functional object. The woven nylon fabric connecting
the posts of Christo's fence, unusual as it might have appeared, "running for
miles through the hills of Sonoma county", constitutes the actual fence.
Similarly, the decorative, but abstract, shape of the belt buckle was visually
indistinguishable from the buckle itself.
The House Report's use of "conceptual separability", however, would
include neither Christo's fence nor the belt buckle in Kieselstein-Cord. The
report refers to "some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identi-
fied as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article" [59]. It appears
Congress intended a design to qualify for protection only if it can be separately
identified, that is, if the design can be visually perceived apart from the
utilitarian aspects of the article.
Kieselstein is further complicated by the fact that the court emphasized that
purchasers "used [the buckles] as ornamentation for parts of the body other
than the waist" [60]; in effect, the court treated the buckles as jewelry. The
court, therefore, added to the expanded notion of separability the standard of
consumer use of an article. Indeed, Nimmer reads Kieselstein to mean "con-
ceptual separability exists where there is any substantial likelihood that even if
the article had no utilitarian use it would still be marketable to some segment
of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities" [61].
The approach of relying on consumer use, however, is problematic [62].
Besides presenting evidentiary problems, there is no justification or precedent
in copyright law for using market success as the standard for according
protection. More important, the Kieselstein decision runs counter to Congress's
intent [63] to exclude the overall shape of utilitarian objects from the realm of
copyright protection. The court, it seems, sympathized with the plaintiff and
sought to avoid the inevitable results of the separability standard. These
unfortunate results are described in Judge Weinstein's dissenting opinion in
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Kieselstein:
The result does deny protection to designers who use modern three-dimensional abstract works
artfully incorporated into a functional object as an inseparable aspect of the article while granting
it to those who attach their independent representational art, or even their trite gimmickry, to a
useful object for purposes of enhancement. Moreover, this result enables the commercial pirates of
the marketplace to appropriate for their own profit, without any cost to themselves, the works of
talented designers who enrich our lives with their intuition and skill. The crass are rewarded, the
artist who creates beauty is not [64].
Ironically, while Judge Weinstein presents the strongest argument in favor of
copyright protection for commercial design, he would not extend such protec-
tion in Kieselstein because "it is not for [the] court to twist the law in order to
achieve a result Congress has denied" [65].
Judge Weinstein touches upon one of the most regrettable results of the
separability standard - the fact that it promotes bad design. The separability
standard conflicts with the examples and teachings of modem industrial
designers who merged aesthetic and utilitarian concerns, striving to create a
form that was a logical and harmonious extension of the function of the useful
article [66]. The basic tenet that form follows function is reflected in the work
of the Bauhaus designers and Frank Lloyd Wright. In general, it epitomizes
prize-winning industrial design over the past forty years. "The best designs are
those in which the appearance springs truly from the structure, and is a logical
expression of it" [67]. In Kieselstein, "[t]he artist has enhanced the appearance
of the buckles by rendering their shape aesthetically pleasing without inter-
fering with function. It is the originator's success in completely integrating the
artistic designs and the functional aspects of the buckles", writes Judge
Weinstein, "that preclude [sic] copyright" [68].
Moreover, even if the separability standard were aesthetically neutral, it
would still be difficult to justify a myriad of decisions in which the copyright
was upheld. For example, in Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., Inc. [69],
copyright was upheld in the antique telephone shape of a pencil sharpener.
Although the Esquire court attempted to distinguish Ted Arnold on the
grounds that the telephone casing could be removed from the actual sharpener
[70], this argument undermines the "overall shape" rationale on which the
Esquire decision is based. In addition, copyright has traditionally been held to
apply to such objects with utilitarian functions as toy banks [71] and stuffed
animals that can be used as pajama bags [72]. Mazer held that the statuette of
a Balinese dancer used as a lamp base was copyrightable, but as one critic
argues, if the statuette were converted into a cigarette lighter, pursuant to
Esquire, it would not be copyrightable because its ornamental aspect cannot be
separately identified [73]. "It seems absurd to contend that the statuette is
copyrightable in one context but not the other, merely because the utilitarian
aspects have been internalized. And if the point is conceded for a Balinese
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dancer, what of a more abstract form reflecting twentieth rather than nine-
teenth century visions" [74]?
4. A feasible alternative: The Moorhead Bill
Among the numerous proposals made in response to this problem is a series
of proposed amendments recommending copyright protection for commercial
design [75]. Congress came close to enacting "The Design Protection Act of
1975," which was initially Title II [76] of the bill that amended the Copyright
Act of 1909 and became the current Copyright Act of 1976. Although the
Senate passed Title II [77] and the Copyright Office strongly favored its
enactment [78], the design copyright amendment was stricken by the House
Judiciary Committee [79]. The Committee thought that "the new form of
design protection provided by Title II could not truly be considered copyright
protection and, therefore, appropriately within the scope of copyright revision"
[80]. The Committee concluded that the issue should be the subject of more
extensive hearings in the next Congress [81].
Title II, thus joined a rather long list of proposed amendments recommend-
ing copyright protection for commercial design [82] in response to the problem
presented by conceptual separability [83], which were proposed but never
enacted. The immediacy of this issue, however, has not subsided. As Barbara
Ringer, the current Register of Copyright, stated: "the full range of design
protection issues ... stands as one of the most significant and pressing items
on the Congressional agenda" [84].
Due in part, perhaps, to the longstanding resistance to extending copyright
to useful objects, the proposed amendments have generally recommended only
modest protection, such as terms of duration much shorter than the "life plus
50 years" term provided under the 1976 Act [85]. Such is the spirit of the
Moorhead bill [86], the salient features of which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Copyright protection is provided to the "author or other proprietor of
an original ornamental design of a useful article" [87]. "Ornamental" is
defined as intending "to make the article attractive or distinct in appearance to
the purchasing or using public" [88] and "original" is defined as "the indepen-
dent creation of an author who did not copy it from another source" [89]. The
definition of "useful article" takes its language from the Copyright Act of
1976:
A "useful article" is an article which in normal use has an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article which
normally is part of a useful article shall be deemed to be a useful article [90].
(2) Protection is not extended to a design which is "staple or commonplace"
or a shape which has become "common, prevalent, or ordinary" [91], or
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol7/iss1/5
S. Tennenbaunm / Copyright protection
different from a commonplace design or ordinary shape only in "insignificant
details or in elements which are variants commonly used in the relevant trades"
[92] or "dictated solely by a utilitarian function" [93].
(3) Protection begins on the date of publication of the registration or the
date the design is first made public, whichever occurs first [94], and lasts for
ten years [95], after which the proprietor may apply for renewal of the
registration [96].
(4) A seller or distributor of an article sold without the consent of the
proprietor of the design shall be deemed an infringer only if "he induced or
acted in collusion with a manufacturer to make ... such article" or if he
refuses to disclose to the proprietor of the design the source of the article, and
he orders the article after having received notice of the protection subsisting in
the design [97].
(5) "The party alleging rights in a design in any action ... shall have the
burden of affirmatively establishing its originality whenever the opposing party
introduces an earlier work which is identical to such design, or so similar as to
make a prima facie showing that the design was copied from such work" [98].
(6) A registered design shall bear legible notice of the name or an accepted
alternative designation of the proprietor [99], the year of the date on which
protection commenced [100] and the words "Protected Design", the abbrevi-
ation "Prot'd Des." or the letter "D" in a circle [101]. The omission of notice
shall not cause loss of protection, but shall prevent any recovery "against a
person who began an undertaking leading to infringement before receiving
written notice of the design protection" [102]. "[N]o injunction shall be had
unless the proprietor of the design shall reimburse said person for any
reasonable expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with such
undertaking incurred before written notice of design protection .... The
burden of providing written notice shall be on the proprietor" [103].
(7) The bill provides for the publication of lists and indices of registered
designs and cancellations, and for the maintenance of a file of the drawings of
registered designs, which will be available to the public "under such conditions
as the Administrator may prescribe" [104].
(8) The proposed legislation shall have no retroactive effect [105]. It will
have a pre-emptive effect on works in which copyright exists only with respect
to its utilization in useful articles [106]. However, "[u]nless and until the
copyright proprietor has obtained ... registration, the ... work shall continue
in all respect to be covered" by the current Copyright Act [107].
(9) Remedies for infringement include injunction [108], damages either
adequate to compensate for the infringement [109] or, alternatively, "the
infringer's profits resulting from the sale of the copies if [the court] finds that
the infringer's sales are reasonably related to the use of the claimant's design"
[110]. "The court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party"
[111], and "may order that all infringing articles, and any plates, molds", and
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other items for making the protected design be forfeited [112].
4.1. Only short-term protection needed
The above provisions will correct the major defect of the design patent
system - a long and onerous procedure for obtaining protection for commer-
cial designs of short-term and uncertain commercial value [113]. In light of the
relatively short "shelf-life" of commercial design, however, a ten-year initial
term might be unnecessarily long.
The Moorhead bill, like prior proposed amendments to the Copyright Act
[114], does not propose that commercial designs should be reclassified as
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" and that the full copyright term of
life of the author plus fifty years should apply. Design copyright is instead
perceived as filling the gaps that leave unprotected designs that qualify neither
as copyrightable works because of their utilitarian function, nor as inventions
[115]. Design copyright would thus alleviate filing and issuance of the design
patent by providing immediate protection before the patent protection is
secured. Because design copyright would be so much easier to obtain than
patent [116], however, one might argue that the initial design copyright term
should be no longer than the average commercial life of the design of a useful
object. The duration of protection that is actually needed for commercial
designers and manufacturers to profit from their designs remains as yet
unclear. And whether protection should cover the entire commercial life of the
design or merely provide a head start is another question facing Congress with
respect to its decision on the duration issue.
The British copyright laws, which currently protect commercial design, are a
working example of many of the provisions proposed by the Moorhead bill.
The following section examines the British system and notes the problems
associated with extending copyright to commercial design as well as the
unforeseen difficulties that have actually occurred. The section considers
whether the problems of the British system would be perpetuated or corrected
in the United States by the enactment of the Moorhead bill.
5. The British system as a model for the Moorhead Bill
5.1. The British copyright laws
The British system provides three kinds of protection for the design of
useful objects. Two of these - patent and design registration - are similar to
U.S. law. The British patent, like that of the United States, protects the
functional concept of an object [117]. The British system of Design Registra-
tion is similar to the U.S. Design Patent in that it provides the originator with
a complete monopoly, thus preventing others from using the same or similar
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designs, whether or not there was copying [118]. Like the U.S. Design Patent,
this protection is intended for the artistic features of industrial design, those
features which appeal to the eye and are not dictated solely by function [119].
The criterion for obtaining Design Registration is, as under U.S. law, novelty
rather than originality [120]. Applications for protection, which lasts a maxi-
mum of fifteen years [121], must be made before the article is placed on the
market [122].
The British commercial designer, however, unlike his American counterpart,
receives full protection under copyright law. The Designs Copyright Act of
1968 [123], amending Section 10 of the Copyright Act of 1956 [124], protects
the design of manufactured articles regardless of artistic merit and utilitarian
function [125]. The statutory progression of the Copyright Act 1956, resulting
in this extensive protection, has been effectively summarized by Louis Steven-
son [126] as follows:
(a) Copyright subsists in every published or unpublished original artistic work 1127]. "Original"
means only that the work originate with the artist or draftsman in the sense that it is his work and
not someone else's [128]. "Artistic works" include drawings irrespective of artistic quality [129],
and drawings are defined to include any diagram, map, chart, or plan [1301. Copyright also subsists
in works of artistic craftsmanship [1311 and sculptures, as artistic works [132].
(b) Copyright in an artistic work is infringed, inter alia, by reproducing the work in any material
form [1331.
(c) Reproduction includes the making of a three-dimensional version of a two-dimensional artistic
work [134].
(d) The words "in any material form" have always been given their full literal meaning, so that
there is no doubt that manufacturing an article from a blueprint or drawing is reproduction in
material form [135].
(e) The copyright in a two-dimensional work, such as a drawing or blueprint, is infringed by
making a three dimensional version of the article illustrated, unless that article does not, to a
non-expert, look like the drawing [136].
(f) Only a substantial part of a work need be reproduced to constitute infringement [137].
(g) Judicial decisions make it clear that it is not necessary to copy the drawing or blueprint itself to
infringe; it is enough to copy a copy, such as an article manufactured from a blueprint [1381.
If no drawing or blueprint of the article exists, the originator still has
recourse to protection by showing that the article is an "artistic work," the
definition of which includes "works of artistic craftsmanship" [139]. Moreover,
unlike the U.S. system, British copyright does not bar the design of useful
objects per se from protection. In the Australian case, Cuisenaire v. Reed
[140], relevant because Australia has adopted the basic definitions and con-
cepts of British law in its protection of commercial design [141], the court
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articulated the following standard:
The true test ... is whether the author in making the article in which copyright is alleged to subsist
was applying his skill and taste to its production with the main object of creating an article which,
even if it be utilitarian, nevertheless will have a substantial appeal to the aesthetic tastes of those
who observe it [142].
The result of this standard is that an otherwise copyrigthable work of artistic
craftsmanship would not be excluded by virtue of its utilitarian function.
As will be illustrated in the following section, although the inclusiveness of
the British system derives in part from its liberal definition of an "artistic
work" or a "work of artistic craftmanship," it is mainly the result of the notion
"that it is not necessary to copy the drawing or blueprint itself to infringe; it is
enough to copy a copy, such as an article manufactured from a blueprint"
[143]. This, of course, is very different from the current U.S. copyright system
which while protecting the blueprints or drawing of a design, permits the
finished article appearing on the market [144]. The effect of deeming the
copying of an article an infringement, rather than requiring, as under U.S. law,
that the drawing itself be copied, is to protect the design of virtually every
useful object that is marketed.
5.2. Problems arising under the British system
Despite several problems arising under British copyright laws, some of
which are discussed in this section, proposals for reform generally recommend
continuing protection for commercial design while narrowing its scope [145].
With respect to its protection of commercial design, the most common criti-
cism of the British system is that is is overinclusive, that it protects purely
functional works devoid of any artistic intension, and thereby distorts the
underlying principle that copyright protects artistic works whereas patent
protects inventions. Indeed, items as prosaic as electric light fixtures [146],
bedpans [147], and automobile replacement parts [148], have been protected
under the same system as fine arts.
One of the problems of protecting these purely functional objects has been
in the field of spare parts. Because spare parts must be exact reproductions of
the originals for them to fit into correct positions, copying is very easy to prove
[149]. Thus, unless a license is issued by the original manufacturer or implicitly
created [150], in most instances any new equipment item designed by a
manufacturer will be free from competition by suppliers of spare parts for up
to fifteen years [1511.
This basic criticism of overinclusiveness raises an issue of policy as well. The
accusation that industrial design not new or original enough to merit design
registration may still obtain copyright protection rings true, for example, in the
case of P.S. Johnson and Associated Ltd. v. Bucko Enterprise Ltd. and others
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[152]. In Johnson, the plaintiff manufacturer sued on the ground that its
artistic copyright in blueprints of a lavatory pan connector was infringed by
the defendant's production of lavatory pan connectors. The case was brought
under the Copyright Act because the design had not been registered under the
Designs Registration Act, and, as critics have pointed out, probably could not
have been, "since form and function were almost one in the plaintiff's design
and its novelty and originality were dubious, to say the least" [1531. The court
found that the defendant's connector appeared to be a three-dimensional
reproduction of the plaintiff's blueprints and, thus, constituted an infringe-
ment, much to the amusement of the press, which noted how "the law in its
majesty deemed such drawings to be as much artistic works as drawings of
Picasso [154]".
5.3. The narrower scope of the Moorhead Bill
Because the Moorhead bill does not propose to protect designs dictated
solely by function, the Copyright Office would not be permitted to register
objects such as spare parts or lavatory pan connectors. The distinction may be
illustrated by comparing the notion of form following function, a basic tenet of
modern commercial design [155], with that of form or design dictated solely by
function. In the latter instance the designer will usually have only one choice of
design to solve the problem at hand. For example, the design for a spare part
allows no room for creativity; the designer must meet standard specifications
or the design will not be successful. Moreover, the designer does not intend to
make the article any more pleasing to the using public via his design.
The Moorhead bill is clearly aimed at the former category. It proposes
protection for the "original ornamental design of a useful article" [156], and
defines "ornamental" as "intend[ing] to make the article attractive or distinct
in appearance to the purchasing or using public" [157]. The bill further guards
against including wholly functional designs by excluding from the protection
designs that are "staple or commonplace" [158].
The Johnson case illustrates another fear of opponents of the proposed
design legislation; copyrighting useful articles would do more than protect the
creative expression - it would lock up the idea as well [159]. As one commen-
tator points out [160], the lavatory pan connector could not have been made in
any shape but the conical one. Therefore, affording copyright protection to the
drawing would be tantamount to protecting an idea. In this case, where the
object "allegedly" copied, was purely functional, it is difficult to understand
how the court inferred copying without actual evidence. As mentioned above,
British law does not require the copying of the blueprint or drawing to find an
infringement, and the court found it sufficient that the defendant's three-di-
mensional object was similar enough to the plaintiffs drawing to conclude that
it had been copied from the drawing. If the plaintiffs design was dictated
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solely by function, however, the same must have been true of the defendant's
design and the British Copyright Act does not preclude a designer from
independently solving the same problem. The Johnson court, however, ap-
parently found that the defendant had not arrived at the same design indepen-
dently.
Because the Moorhead bill does not protect designs that hold the sole key to
the functional nature of the object, there is no dnger of monopolizing
utilitarian objects. "If copyright is to be accorded only to the non-functional
form of a work, this would not inhibit competitors from making available to
the public- the utilitarian essence of the industrial product. That such a
competitor could not copy another's aesthetic form would not affect the
competitive product's utility" [161].
The crux of most economic arguments advanced against extending copyright
to industrial design is the fear that this extension will render useful articles
inaccessible to the general public. The Moorhead bill, it appears, was con-
ceived with these arguments in mind. The Register's brief in Esquire [162], for
example, lists three economic arguments against design copyright:
First, in the case of some utilitarian objects, like scissors or paper clips, shape is mandated purely
by function. If one manufacturer were given the copyright to the design of such an article, it could
completely prevent others from producing the same article [163].
The obvious response, of course, is that the Moorhead bill would not protect
an object the shape of which is mandated purely by function. Moreover, the
designs of items such as scissors and paper clips would most likely be excluded
by virtue of being "staple or commonplace".
Second, consumer preference sometimes demands uniformity of shape for certain utilitarian
articles, like stoves for instance. People simply expect and desire certain everyday useful articles to
look the same particular way. Thus, to give one manufacturer the monopoly on such a shape would
also be anticompetitive [sic] [164].
The response again, is that everyday objects that are "staple and commonp-
lace" are not subject to protection. And as Nimmer points out [165], the
requirement of originality will preclude copyright protection for most stan-
dardized shapes.
Finally, the Register contends:
[Ilnsofar as geometric shapes are concerned, there are only a limited amount of basic shapes, such
as circles, squares, rectangles and ellipses. These shapes are obviously in the public domain and
accordingiy it would be unfair to grant a monopoly on the use of any particular such shape, no
matter how aesthetically well is was integrated into a utilitarian article [1661.
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Nimmer's response is that "insofar as a shape is in the public domain ... no
copyright may be claimed regardless of whether it is integrated into a utilitarian
article" [1671. The bill confirms this, specifically excluding under the rubric of
"staple or commonplace", designs "such as a standard geometric figure,
familiar symbol, emblem, or motif, or other shape, pattern, or configuration
which has become common, prevalent, or ordinary" [168].
6. Conclusion
An alternative is needed to the inadequate protection currently offered to
commercial design by the Design Patent Act which has been unable to prevent
flagrant instances of design piracy. Although copyright is much better suited to
providing immediate and inexpensive protection for designs that are usually
shortlived and of uncertain commercial potential, copyright is available only to
commercial designs that can be identified separately from the utilitarian aspect
of the useful article. The result of this "separability standard" is that the law at
present excludes from protection most abstract designs and designs in which
aesthetic and utilitarian concerns are merged.
The Moorhead bill would render the copyright law aesthetically neutral
toward commercial design. Because the bill does not propose protection for
designs dictated solely by function, as does the British Copyright Act, it is able
to refute the basic economic arguments commonly advanced against design
copyright.
The ten-year duration of the initial term of protection proposed by the bill,
however, appears unnecessarily long. What is needed is a period of protection
limited to the period in which a designer can be reasonably expected to reap
his economic benefit. An appropriate term might be best determined in
conjunction with the designers and manufacturers who would be affected
should the bill become law.
Finally, in light of the history of proposed legislation for design copyright,
the need for congressional action appears pressing indeed. The Moorhead bill,
tailored with the fears in mind of longstanding opponents to such amend-
ments, offers the designer modest but adequate protection. It should be
enacted.
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Notes
[1] 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
[2] "Commercial design" is herein used interchangeably with the "design of useful objects" and
refers to any visual aspect of a useful article (e.g. cars, furniture, appliances) intended to make the
article more desirable to the consumer. Fashion design is also generally included under the rubric
of commercial design. However, because the proposed legislation for design copyright, which is the
focus of this Comment, excludes articles of clothing, copyright protection for fashion design will
not be considered herein.
[3] Copyright grants the creator a proprietary right in his artistic expression. be it literary,
musical, or visual (see Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) by allowing him or her the
exclusive control over the market for the work. The underlying notion is that copyright will serve
as an incentive to the creator, and thereby serve its constitutional purpose of promoting "the
progress of science and the useful arts.' U.S. Const., Art. I, See. 8, C1.8. A secondary purpose is to
reward authors for their contributions to society. But cf Chafee, Reflections on the Law of
Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev., 503, 506-511 (1945) ("The primary purpose of copyright is, of
course, to benefit the author.")
[4] Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). See also Horowitz, The Case for the Designer Belt
Buckle: The Problem of Copyrighting Utiitarian Objects, Vol. VI: 3 Art and the Law (1981).
[5] See infra text accompanying notes 36-39.
[6] Between 1914 and 1957 nearly 50 design protection bills were introduced, and a number of
hearings were held. Draft, Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, Chap. VII, 4-13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Copyright
Register's Report"]; see also Bibliography on Design Protection Supplement 1976, 81 (compiled by
Copyright Office, listing "Design Copyright Bills Introduced in Congress - 1959-1975").
[7] See, e.g., Statement of the National Retail Merchants Association on the Subjects of S. 776
Now Before the Sub-Committee of the House Judiciary Committee, January 14, 1964.
[8] This was one of the economic arguments made in the Register's brief in Esquire v. Ringer,
591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See infra text accompanying notes 44-52.
19] The pertinent provision states in full:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying music;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Copyright covers only the expression of the work, not the idea embodied
within it. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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[10] Design piracy can be described as follows. A manufacturer who has undertaken the
expense of commissioning a designer and producing and marketing a new style, and whose revenue
from successful designs must cover his losses from unsuccessful ones, may find that a competitor
has copied his prized modes and saturated the market before he, the originator, can dispose of his
stock. See Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1520
(1959) [hereinafter cited as "Artistic Aspects"]. See also Dalin, Design Protection: Walking the
Pirate Plank?, 12 Bull. Cr. Soc. 321, 322 (1964-65). (" '[The design pirate] had no design cost. He
doesn't have to pay for stylists .... [Design pirates] spend no time in the development or
promotion of their fabric or design because the success of the pattern and the acceptability of the
pattern have already been established by the originator of the pattern. ") (citing Hearings on S.
1884.)
[11] See, e.g., I Nimmer on Copyright (1980), § 2.08[B], 2-96.3, note 115.1 (responding to the
anticompetitive effects which the Register in Esquire claimed would occur if copyright were
extended to the design of useful objects) [hereinafter cited as "Nimmer"]. See infra text
accompanying notes 162-167.
[12] H.R. 2985, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as "Moorhead Bill"]. The bill is
currently before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration. As of the date of
this comment, no action on the bill has been taken. See infra text accompanying notes 85-112 for
a discussion of the contents of the bill.
[13] Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3,5 Stat. 543.
[14] 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).
115] See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951)
("[t]he standards for patents and copyrights are basically different"). In 1790, the year after the
adoption of the Constitution, the first Congress enacted two statutes, separately dealing with
patents and copyrights. The patent statute, enacted April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109, provided that
patents should be issued only if the Secretary of State, Secretary of War and the Attorney General,
or any two of them " 'deem[ed] the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important' ". Id.
at 101 (citing Patent Statute). The Supreme Court requires that "to be valid, a patent must disclose
a high degree of uniqueness, ingenuity and inventiveness". Id. at 100. Copyright, unlike patent,
does not protect the author's ideas. See supra text accompanying note 8. Nor does it provide the
complete monopoly granted by patent. " 'Independent reproduction of a copyrighted ... work is
not an infringement,' whereas it is vis-a-vis a patent" 191 F.2d at 103 (citing Ainstein v. Edward B.
Marber Music Corp. 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936)). Thus, " 'original' in reference to a copyrighted
work means only that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the author." Id. at 102 (citing
Barrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)).
f16] 35 U.S.C. § 103.
[17] See, e.g., Brofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393
U.S. 1031 (1969) (design must be: "(1) new, (2) original, (3) ornamental, (4) nonobvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art, and (5) not primarily for the purpose of serving a functional or
utilitarian purpose"); See also, Application of Rousso, 222; F.2d 729, (C.C.P.A. 1955).
[18] Spaulding v. Guardian Light Co., 267 F.2d 111, 112 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S.
883 (1959).
[19] Ringer, The Case for Design Protection and the O'Mahoney Bill, 7 Bull. Cr. Soc. n.3(d) at
26.
[20] In upholding copyright in a poster used for advertisement, Justice Holmes stated for the
court, "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
[21] Artistic Aspects, supra note 10, at 1523-24.
[22] Copyright Register's Report, supra note 6, at 187.
[23] 35 F.2d 279 (2nd Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 278 (1930).
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[24] Id.; see also Jackson o. Quickslip Co., 110 F.2d 731 (creator of a greeting card who
attached pair of doll's rubber pants to inside of card did not suffer infringement of copyright when
another corporation did likewise because the rubber pants were not within the copyright).
[25] See supra note 9.
[26] See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
[27] see e.g. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
[28] See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); see also Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249 ("Others are free to copy the
original. They are not free to copy the copy.").
[29] 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
130] See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
131] See 35 U.S.C. § 173, as amended August 27, 1982.
[32] 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
[33] See supra text accompanying note 20.
[341 See supra note 19.
[35] See supra text accompanying note 22.
[36] 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
[37] Copyright Register's Report, supra note 6, at 4.
[38] 347 U.S. at 217.
[39] Id. at 218.
[40] See Horowitz, supra note 4, at 3.
[41] Id. at 61.
[42] The 1976 Act provides: "[t]he design of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article". 17 U.S.C. § 101.
[43] 591 F.2d 796, 802-804. Esquire, decided before the 1976 Act became effective, neverthe-
less applied the standard of the new Act. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
[44] 414 F. Supp. 939, 940 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796.
[45] 414 F. Supp. at 940.
[46] Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright, Bulletin No. 15 (1910), 8,
quoted in 414 F.Supp. at 941.
[47] 414 F.Supp. at 941.
[48] H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976), quoted in 591 F.2d 796, 803 (emphasis
added).
[49] 591 F.2d at 804.
[50] Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
[51] Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, Inc, 180 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976).
[52] 591 F.2d at 804.
[53] 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.), reo'd, 489 F.Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
[54] Jewelry is subject to copyright protection. See Boucher v. Du Boyes I,:c, 253 F.2d 948, 949
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958); Cynthia Designs, Inc. v. Robert Zentall, Ina, 416 F.
Supp. 510, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Trifari, Knussman & Fishel, Inc u. Cahrel Co., 134 F. Supp.
551, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Although the above-cited cases were decided prior to the 1976 Act,
they still constitute valid precedents given the congressional adoption at the Copyrights Office's
definition. See 632 F.2d at 993-994, n.5.
[55] 632 F.2d at 991-992.
[56] Id. at 993.
[57] Horowitz, supra note 40, at 62.
[58] As Nimmer stated, supra note 11, [Christo's Running Fence] "did not contain sculptural
features that were physically separable from the utilitarian aspects of the fence, but the whole
point of the work was that the artistic aspects of the work were conceptually separable." Nimmer,
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supra note 11 cited in Kieselstein, 632 F.2d at 993. (Christo is a well-known conceptual artist. His
"Running Fence" was an actual fence, the vertical posts of which were connected with fabric. set
up through the hill country of two California counties for purely artistic purposes.)
[591 See supra note 48.
[60] 632 F.2d at 993. The Kieselstein court stated, "Pieces of applied art, these buckles may be
considered jewelry, the form of which is subject to copyright protection." Id.
[61] Nimmer, supra note 11, at 2-96, 2-97.
[62] See Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in
Useful Articles, 67 Minn. L Rev. 707, 734 (discussion of various consumer-based models as
alternatives to the separability standard).
[631 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
[64] 632 F.2d at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
[65] Id.
[66] For an overview of modern industrial design, see generally K. Baynes, Industrial Design
and the Community 10-11 (1976); V. Papanek, Design for the Real World 22-23 (1971).
[671 W. Cain, Engineering Product Design 157 (1979).
[681 632 F.2d at 994.
[69] 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
[70] 591 F.2d at 802 n.19 ("the registered article - a simulated antique telephone - could be
separated physically and exist independently as a work of art apart from the pencil sharpener
housed within the telephone casing.").
[71] See. e.g., Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (copyright notice on toy bank sufficient to accord the toy protection); Royalty Designs, Inc.
v. Thrifticheck Service Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (same).
[72] See, e.g., R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(stuffed animals with features of pajama bag sufficiently original to receive copyright protection).
[73] Denicola, supra note 62 at 738.
[741 Id.
[75] See Bibliography on Design, supra note 6.
[76] During the Hearings on Design Legislation, July 17, 1975, Mr. Alan Latman, who had
served as Counsel to the National Committee for Design Legislation, summarized the provisions of
Title I as follows:
(1) An original design can be protected if it is the original creation of its author, an original design
being one that has not been copied; it may not meet any test of obviousness or inventiveness as
required by the patent law, but it cannot be staple or commonplace nor dictated by function; (2)
The original designer is protected only against unauthorized copying of the protected design; (3)
Duration is for 5 years with an optional second 5 year term; (4) Protection begins upon public
exhibition, sale or offering of an actual article embodying the design - "making public" of the
design; (5) Registration within 6 months after the design is made known. An Administrator is to
be designated by the President. There is no requirement of a search or comparison with earlier
designs, but a proper party may petition the Administrator for cancellation of registration of a
design not subject to protection; (6) Notice or marking: requirements as to form and position are
flexible and protection is not forever forfeited if notice is omitted, although omission may limit the
design owner's remedies against infringers; (7) Infringement: recovery from anyone who, without
authority, purposely makes or imports articles embodying a copy of the protected design, and
copyright proprietors cannot recover from sellers, assemblers, processors or innocent parties
generally; (8) Remedies: injunction; damages which can be increased to $1.00 per copy or $5000,
whichever is greater; possible forfeiture or destruction of all infringing articles, plates, molds, etc;
recovery of costs and possible attorneys' fees; (9) Interrelation with Design Patent and Copyright:
the new design protection does not affect availability of design patents, but protection would
terminate as soon as the design patent is issued.
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Copyright Law Revision Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
reprinted in Bibliography on Design, supra note 6, at 92-93.
Mr. Latman testified that he thought Title II should be adopted, stating that "it seeks to afford
moderate protection to original, commercially valuable designs which may not be considered
'inventions' or works of art; such protection (being) available without undue expense for the
smaller manufacturer". Id. at 93.
[77] S.22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (1975); see 122 Cong. Rec. S.17, 251 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976).
[78] Copyright Register's Report, supra note 6, at Ch. VII, 21.
[79] H. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5659, 5663.
[80] Id.; see also Copyright Register's Report, supra note 6, at ch. VII. 15.
[81] H. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 79 at 5663.
[82] See supra note 6.
[83] See supra text accompanying notes 36-74.
[84] Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 951 (1977).
[85] See supra note 76.
[861 Moorhead Bill, supra note 12.
[871 Id. § 901(a).
[88] Id. § 901(b)(3). Note that the standard is based on the designer's intent, rather than the
aesthetic or the commercial success of the design. See supra note 60.
[89] Moorhead bill § 901(b)(4).
[90] Id. § 901(b)(1) (embracing language of Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101).
[911 Id. § 902(b).
[92] Id. § 902(c).
[93] Id. § 902(d).
[94] Id. § 904. Registration is obtained according to § 912, which states that after applying for
registration and payment of the registration free in accordance with the Act (the normal fee is
$15), "the Administrator shall determine whether or not the application relates to a design which
on its face appears to be subject to protection under this chapter, and if so, the Administrator shall
register the design. Registration under this subsection shall be announced by publication. The date
of registration shall be the date of publication".
[95] Moorhead Bill, § 905.
[96] Id. § 909.
[97] Id. § 908(a)(2)(i, ii).
[98] Id. § 908(e).
[99] Id. § 906(a)(3).
[100] Id. § 906(a)(2).
[101] Id. § 906(a)(1).
[102] Id. § 907.
[1031 Id.
[104] Id. § 914(a), (b).
[105] Id. § 934.
[106] Id. § 935(e), (f).
[107] Id. § 935(e).
[1081 Id. § 921.
[109] Id. § 922(a).
[110] Id. § 922(b).
[111] Id. § 922(d).
[112] Id. § 922(e).
[1131 See supra note 24.
[114] See supra note 76.
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[115] Id. (testimony of Latman at Hearings on Design Legislation).
[116] See supra text accompanying notes 13-35.
[1171 See generally. The Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 Ch. 87.
[1181 see The Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 Ch. 88, § 7.
[119] Registered Designs Act, 1949, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, Ch. 88, § 1(3).
[1201 Id. § 1, 2. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 3-5 (description of design patent criteria).
[1211 Registered Designs Act, 1949, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, Ch. 88, § 8.
[122] Id. § 3(1)(5).
[123] Design Copyright Act, 1968, Ch. 68.
[1241 The Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2 Ch. 74.
Prior to amendment of the Copyright Act, 1956, by the Design Copyright Act, 1968, industrial
designs were excluded from protection under artistic copyright if the designs were, or could have
been, registered under the Registered Designs Act 1949. However, designs which could not have
been so registered, because for example they were wholly functional, were not excluded from
artistic copyright protection ... . The Design Copyright Act 1968 which was a Private Members
Bill intended to aid the furniture, toy and costume jewelry industries ... amended the Act in a way
which resulted in the extension of artistic copyright to all industrial designs.
Stevenson, Protection for Industrial Desings under the British Copyright Act 1956, 8 A.P.L.A. 369,
371 n.13 [hereinafter cited as Stevenson].
[1251 The Copyright Act 1956, § 10, as amended by the Design Copyright Act 1968.
[126] See Stevenson, supra note 124, at 371, 372.
[127] Id. at 371 (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 3).
[128] Id (citing University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd. 2 Ch. 601, 609).
[129] Id. (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 3(1)(a)).
[130] Id. (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 48).
[131] Id. (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 3(1)(c)).
[1321 Id. (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 3(1)(a)).
[133] Id. (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 3(5)(a)).
[134] Id. (citing copyright Act, 1956, § 48).
[135] Id. at 372 (citing Bradbury, Agnew and Co. v. Day 32 TLR 349, for proposition that
re-enactment on stage of a cartoon first published in Punch held to be reproduction in a material
form). 134.
[136] Id. (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 9 (8)).
[137] Id. (citing Copyright Act, 1956, § 49(1)).
[138] Id. (citing British Northrop Ltd v. Texteam Blackburn Ltd. 1973 FSR 241). Compare Jack
Adelman, Inc. v. Sonnets & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (picture of a dress may
be copyrighted but the dress itself may not be).
[139] Copyright Act 1956, § 3, defines artistic works as follows:
(I) In this Act "artistic work" means a work of any of the following descriptions, that is to say,
(a) the following, irrespective of artistic quality, namely paintings, sculptures, drawings,
engravings and photographs;
(b) works of architecture, being either buildings or models for buildings;
(c) works of artistic craftmanship, not falling within either of the preceding paragraphs.
[140] 1963 VR 719.
[141] Copyright Statute "An Act relating to copyright and for other purposes", Number 63,
June 27, 1968.
[142] Cuisenaire, supra note 140 at 730.
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[143] See supra text accompanying note 138.
[144] See supra note 7.
[145] See, eg., Baillie, Design Copyright Protection in the United Kingdom, 15 Int'l Lawyer 92
(1981); Cornish, Cumulative Protection for Industrial Designs, 8 U. Brit. Col. L. Rev. 219 (1973).
[1461 See Merchant Adventurers v. M. Grew, (1972) 1 Ch. 242.
[147] See P.S. Johnson and Associates Ltd v. Bucko Enterprises Ltd. and Others, (1975) 1
N.Z.L.t 311.
[148] See British Leyland Motors Corp. Ltd. v. Wyatt Interpart Co., Ltd., (1979) FSR 583.
[1491 Baillie, supra note 144, at 101.
[150] See, eg., Hoover P.L.C. v. George Hulme (Sto) Ltd. and another, (1982) FSR 565, (1982)
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